Michigan Law Review
Volume 101

Issue 6

2003

Discussing the First Amendment
Christina E. Wells
University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of the
United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Christina E. Wells, Discussing the First Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1566 (2003).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol101/iss6/9

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

DISCUSSING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Christina E. Wells*
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA. Edited

by Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press. 2002. Pp. x, 330. Cloth, $35.

Since the First Amendment's inception, Americans have agreed
that free expression is foundational to our democratic way of life.1
Though we agree on this much, we have rarely agreed on much else
regarding the appropriate parameters of free expression. Is the First
Amendment absolute or does it allow some regulation of speech?
Should the First Amendment protect offensive speech, pornography,
flag-burning? Why do we protect speech - to promote the search for
truth, to promote self-governance, or to protect individual autonomy?2
History is rife with disagreements regarding these issues to which
there are no definitive answers. Certainly, the text of the First
Amendment does not help;3 nor do the contemporaneous but
conflicting historical documents.
In light of the First Amendment's textual generality, the Supreme
Court has had to make up free speech doctrine as it goes along,
using whatever tools it can find. The result is a complex set of legal
rules regulating speech and expressive conduct that evolved over
the last century, which has endured its fair share of criticism. Increas
ingly, scholars claim that the Court's free speech decisions are
theoretically incoherent4 or untrue to the First Amendment's original

* Enoch N. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law.
B.A. 1985, University of Kansas; J.D. 1988, University of Chicago. -Ed.

l. DAYID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTfEN YEARS 13 (1997); see a/so
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2002, at 14, 23 (2002)
(showing that Americans currently believe that First Amendment protections are essential
to our way of life).

2. Compare ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 24-27 (1948) (self-governance theory), with David A.J. Richards, Free
Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 45, 62 (1974) (self-fulfillment theory), and Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213-18 (1972) (autonomy theory).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . . ).
"

4. See, e.g. , Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249 (1995).
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roots.5 Criticism of the Court is also apparent at the public level, albeit
in a more indirect manner. Recent polls show that the American
public, although valuing free expression in the abstract, increasingly
believes that the "First Amendment goes too far in the rights it
guarantees," a trend exacerbated by security concerns arising after the
September 11th terrorist attacks.6
The Court has certainly left itself open to criticism. First
Amendment doctrine is complex. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
often fails to support adequately its decisions with sound reasoning,
instead relying on rhetoric and/or selective precedent.7 Finally, the
increasing number of fractured (and sometimes rancorous) opinions
suggests a lack of coherence to Supreme Court decisions or that the
Court is more political than judicial in nature.8 But to say that First
Amendment doctrine is increasingly complex and controversial is not
to say that it is incoherent or that free speech rights have gone too far.
True, Supreme Court resolutions of individual, hard cases are often
easily criticized. Nevertheless, the structure of our free speech law
makes sense, providing a useful framework for resolving most disputes
and understanding when and why speech should be protected. Moreo
ver, the complexity and controversy associated with First Amendment
doctrine are virtues rather than failings because they reflect the
ongoing dialogue and experimentation that is as critical to constitu
tional adjudication as it is to democracy.9
At a time when the First Amendment is in danger of losing its
cachet, Eternally Vigilant, an eclectic set of essays edited by Lee
Bollinger10 and Geoffrey Stone,11 reminds us of the importance of

5. See, e.g. , ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 140-53 (1996);
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First A mendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2035 (1971).
6. FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, supra note 1, at 2, 9-10. While seventy-five percent of
respondents to the First Amendment Center's survey believed that free speech was essential
to our way of life, in response to concrete questions regarding particular speech, sixty-four
percent believed that people should not be allowed to say racially offensive things in public
and forty-six percent believed that the Constitution should be amended to ban desecration
of the United States flag. In both circumstances, public opinion deviates from existing Su
preme Court precedent.
7. See Christina E. Wells, Of Communists and Anti-Abortion Protestors: The
Consequences of Falling into the Theoretical Abyss, 33 GA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1998).
8. Id. at 5 n.20: Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 29,
1989, at 49, 53 (noting the increasingly "cynical" view that "constitutional law is only a mat
ter of which president appointed the last few justices").
9. For a more in-depth discussion of the fluid nature of constitutional adjudication, see
generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002).
10. Professor of Law & President, Columbia University.
11. H arry Kalven, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chi
cago Law School.

1568

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 101:1566

dialogue and experimentation in First Amendment doctrine. Rather
than attempt to bring a rigid coherence to our system of free expres
sion, Eternally Vigilant locates the heart of the First Amendment in its
very complexity and embraces the resulting debate as part and parcel
of the First Amendment itself. As the editors note, their goals are to
"elucidate some of the more perplexing challenges and mysteries"
associated with the protection of free expression and "inspire the kind
of thought, deliberation, and debate that are essential" to free and
open discourse (p. x).
Eternally Vigilant reinforces the positive dialogic aspects of the
First Amendment in several ways. First, the diverse essays cover a
variety of topics and viewpoints. This variety of lenses with which to
view the First Amendment allows far greater access to the free speech
debate than any single theory of free expression possibly could.
Second, the often-conflicting essays aptly demonstrate that dialogue
and debate about the First Amendment is an affirmative good in itself.
Finally, many of the essays examine various potential influences on
the creation and evolution of First Amendment law. They thus take
free speech principles out of the isolated discussions of abstract theory
and doctrine that so often dominate free speech scholarship. Such
examination dramatically adds to our understanding and analysis of
why the Court sometimes protects speech when it is controversial or
counterintuitive to do so.
Despite its many good qualities, Eternally Vigilant nevertheless
suffers from a flaw common to First Amendment scholarship - a
tendency to give short shrift to study of the social, psychological,
historical, and political factors that influence the Court's decision
making and, thus, free speech doctrine. Discussion including these
influences would facilitate an even greater understanding of free
speech doctrine and the principles that underlie it.
I.

ETERNALLY VIGILANT

Constructed primarily around ten essays written by the premier
free speech scholars of our time, Eternally Vigilant begins with a col
loquy between its two editors, themselves heavy hitters in the First
Amendment field, that is designed to "introduce nonexperts to
the labyrinth of theory, doctrine, and social texture that mark the
jurisprudence of the First Amendment and the essays in [the] book"
(p. x). It thus summarizes the history and foundations of free speech
law, focusing initially on several post-World War I cases in which the
Supreme Court, facing the First Amendment implications of seditious
speech and attempts to punish it, generated the origins of modern
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doctrine. 12 It then follows the evolution of this original doctrine
through the twentieth century, explaining how it relates to various
aspects of modern free speech law, including the Supreme Court's
rules with respect to content-based and content-neutral regulations
(pp. 15-16, 19-21), the legal issues associated with the Court's designa
tion of some speech as "low value" (pp. 8-11), the rules relating to
public access to certain public property (pp. 11-12), the prohibition
against prior restraints (p. 17), and the differing treatment of various
media outlets (pp. 12-14).
With the general overview of First Amendment law established,
the essays begin with a historical piece, titled Free Speech and the
Common Law Constitution, by David Strauss. A response to origi
nalist and textualist conceptions of the First Amendment, Strauss
posits that neither is the actual source of free speech doctrine (pp. 3344) Rather, Strauss argues that the fundamental principles of constitu
tional law "did not begin to emerge as a coherent body of legal princi
ples until well into the twentieth century" and that these principles
emerged "in a way that was .. . typical of the common law" (p. 44).
Tracing the evolution of free speech law from its roots in post-World
War I decisions beginning with Schenck v. United States,13 Strauss
notes that modern free speech doctrine is a study of evolution,
whereby the Court makes decisions based upon the particularized
circumstances of a controversy, legal principles derived from past
cases, and policy decisions appropriate for the time. As time passes,
the Court, relying on previous decisions, modifies or abandons princi
ples as it gains "a more thorough understanding of the kinds of issues
involved in establishing constitutional protections for speech" (p. 47).
Vincent Blasi's essay, Free Speech and Good Character, shifts from
an examination of doctrinal evolution to a discussion of the ultimate
theoretical question associated with the First Amendment: Why
should we protect expression? Acknowledging that most proponents
of free expression accord it high priority for one of three reasons promotion of human autonomy, promotion of the search for truth, and
promotion of self-governance - Blasi proposes a fourth that he ar
gues has greater explanatory power. Building upon the writings of
John Milton, Blasi asserts that "a culture that prizes and protects
expressive liberty nurtures in its members certain character traits such
as inquisitiveness, distrust of authority, willingness to take initiative,
and the courage to confront evil" that are valuable "for their instru
mental contribution to collective well-being, social as well as political"
.

12. Pp. 1-8; see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
13. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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(p.62).In contrast, a culture without free expression reinforces certain
character flaws, including laziness, stubbornness, lack of trust and
confidence, and overzealous rush to judgment (p. 68). Thus, Blasi
notes that the character building of the First Amendment is "a coun
terweight . .. to the natural tendency of all citizens . . . to lose confi
dence in reason and pursue their goals through force" (p.78).
Like Strauss's article, Kent Greenawalt's "Clear and Present
Danger" and Criminal Speech examines the Court's foundational
decisions and their evolution to modern doctrine, primarily focusing
on the meaning of the clear-and-present-danger test established in
Schenck. As Greenawalt notes, that test was hardly speech-protective
in its original form, allowing punishment of speech in circumstances
when there was little danger of harm (pp. 98-103). In later cases, how
ever, the test came to have new meaning as the Court's views on
speech protection and the requirements of "clear" and "present"
changed (pp. 104-07). Ultimately, after a series of fits and starts, the
Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio14 settled on the extremely speech
protective version of the test still in use today. Greenawalt uses this
evolution to discuss the difficult issues associated with the question of
whether criminal speech - for example, solicitation or counseling should be protected, ultimately concluding that, because of the
relationship to advocacy of political ideas, public forms of such speech
should enjoy far greater protection than private forms (pp. 113-19).
Richard Posner's piece, The Speech Market and the Legacy of
Schenck, similarly focuses on Schenck's clear-and-present-danger
test. His purpose, however, is to show that Schenck introduced an
instrumentalist approach to the First Amendment, one that balances
the costs and benefits of speech in a particular circumstance to
determine whether that speech should be protected or subject to
governmental regulation. Posner extends the clear-and-present-danger
test's instrumentalist beginnings, formalizing it into an equation (B •
pHl(l+d)" + 0-A) that allows us to identify concrete costs and benefits
of speech versus governmental regulation (p. 125). Using variables
such as the costs and benefits of speech along with the likelihood and
imminence of their occurrence, the expression's offensiveness, and the
costs of regulation, Posner analyzes a variety of speech issues, ranging
from seditious advocacy and campaign finance to regulation of hate
speech and the Internet (pp. 127-31, 144-51).
In Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, Robert Post seeks to reconcile doctrine with popular
theoretical accounts of free speech. As Post notes, two of the most
powerful explanations for protecting free expression - the search for
truth in the marketplace of ideas, and democratic self-governance -

14.

395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam )

.
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emerged from the Court's post-World War I decisions. There exist,
however, significant doctrinal gaps and inconsistencies in the Court's
decisions that these theories cannot explain (pp. 154-68). To fill these
gaps, Post offers a different theoretical account - one he terms
"participatory democracy" (p. 169). Post argues that American juris
prudence shows "an overriding constitutional conviction to interpret
the First Amendment 'to ensure that the individual citizen can effec
tively participate in and contribute to our republican system of
self-government.' "15 The commitment to participatory democracy
explains the Court's willingness to protect some categories of speech,
for example, offensive speech, when other theories cannot (pp. 16869). Post concludes that the Court chooses between theoretical
accounts to justify its doctrinal approach to various categories of
speech, thus "limit[ing] the kind of doctrinal simplicity and clarity that
is constitutionally obtainable" (p. 173).
Frederick Schauer's First Amendment Opportunism explores
empirical bases of First Amendment doctrine. According to Schauer,
the culture of First Amendment discourse ... exhibits many of the same
features as being faced with driving a nail with a pipe wrench. With sur
prising frequency, people and organizations with a wide array of political
goals find that society has not given them the doctrinally or rhetorically
effective argumentative tools they need to advance their goals. (p.175)

They thus turn to the First Amendment as a second-best tool to
further their agendas. Schauer examines this phenomenon of First
Amendment opportunism in various arenas, including the regulation
of commercial speech, nude dancing, and campaign finance (pp. 17790), arguing that the existence and frequency of such opportunism
"can tell us much about the power of the First Amendment today as a
political force and rhetorical device" (p. 191). He concludes that, while
First Amendment opportunism may be a problem for those who per
ceive it as distorting free speech doctrine, it also may simply reflect the
Constitution's role as a common-law document (pp. 196-97).
Stanley Fish's The Dance of Theory seeks to debunk the notion
that neutral, theoretical explanations of the First Amendment exist.
Fish dismisses the notion that the First Amendment stands "for" any
particular proposition, such as protecting the marketplace of ideas,
and argues that proponents of such propositions move from the realm
of ostensibly neutral abstraction to a "regime of censorship" that in
fuses their own substantive notions of good (p. 199). Fish then decon
structs the arguments of several commentators who have ostensibly
proposed neutral, theoretical regimes in response to their own criti
cisms of First Amendment doctrine (pp. 201-09) and argues that such
regimes are "formal abstractions [which] have no content of their own,
15. Pp. 169-70 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co.
(1982)).

v.

Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604

1572

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:1566

and to get content they must go to the very realm of messy partisan
disputes about substantive goods of which they claim to be independ
ent" (p. 224). He concludes that the continuing lure of theory reflects
both an unwillingness to admit that a free speech principle is unavail
able and a desire to give one's views on free speech a special pedigree.
In the Invisible Hand of the Marketplace of Ideas, Lillian BeVier
compares the current market for speech with other markets, noting
that in recent years legal liability for harms resulting from political
speech has decreased while legal liability for harms in other markets,
such as products liability, has increased (pp. 233-41). She attributes
this phenomenon to the Court's assumptions that "providers of politi
cal information must be protected from liability because the market
fails to permit them to internalize the full social benefits of their activ
ity, whereas producers of other products must be subjected to liability
because the market permits them to externalize some of their costs"
(p. 239). Although she critiques these assumptions as empirically
unproven and incomplete, BeVier concludes that they reflect some
"hitherto underappreciated features of the market for information,"
that allow the press to fulfill its constitutional function of informing
the public (p. 242).
Owen Fiss's The Censorship of Television also focuses on contem
porary First Amendment issues, specifically the regulation of televi
sion and its relationship to democracy. As one of the most important
tools in the "informal educational system" essential to citizens partici
pating in a democracy, Fiss argues, we must protect television from
censorial threats to its educative role (pp. 257-60). Fiss identifies two
kinds of censorship - traditional state censorship and managerial
censorship involving a private actor within the television industry (pp.
260-80). The Court, Fiss argues, has had little trouble protecting the
educative function of television from state censorship but more
difficulty in decisions involving managerial censorship. He contends,
however, that attempts to rein in managerial censorship preserve tele
vision's educative function although superficially appearing to be
abridgments of speech. Despite the Supreme Court's past practices in
the managerial-censorship area, Fiss notes with approval that recent
free speech jurisprudence may increasingly protect against managerial
censorship.
Like Fiss, Cass Sunstein grapples with whether the First
Amendment allows regulation of certain media to improve the opera
tion of the speech market in The Future of Free Speech. According to
Sunstein, the First Amendment should be understood as promoting
"deliberative democracy," a system that contemplates "a large degree
of reflection and debate, both within the citizenry and within govern
ment itself" (p. 292). Emerging technologies pose a danger to delib
erative democracy because they allow individuals increasingly to filter
what they hear and thus withdraw from public debate (pp. 285-86).

Discussing the First Amendment

May 2003]

1573

Sunstein suggests that governmental regulation designed to enhance
deliberative democracy may be appropriate, including such measures
as disclosure requirements, must-carry rules, incentives for self
regulation, and government subsidies of speech (pp. 304-09).
II.

DISCUSSING THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Truthfully, these essays break little new ground - previous publi
cations present several of the authors' thoughts.16 Nevertheless, there
is great value in bringing these ideas together in a single volume.
Although the authors have very different perspectives regarding the
First Amendment, all of the essays are simply excellent. Exposure to
such concentrated thoughtfulness is both illuminating and pleasurable
to read.
More important, however, is that these different perspectives
facilitate access to the First Amendment. Whether it is David Strauss's
explanation of the evolving, piecemeal, and case-bound nature of free
speech doctrine, Vincent Blasi's novel philosophical basis for
protecting free expression, or Cass Sunstein's argument that free
speech doctrine should move toward a concept respecting deliberative
democracy, there is something for almost everyone in this book.
Disagree with Blasi's theoretical precept regarding protection of
speech? Then perhaps you will find what you want in Richard Posner's
explicitly utilitarian accounting of costs and benefits of speech. For
those trying to understand when and why to protect expression, this
variety of perspectives brings the book to life in a concrete way and
makes the First Amendment far more accessible than a single, static,
or abstract approach to free expression. And the more accessible such
ideas are, the easier they are to discuss.
Moreover, the variety of perspectives in Eternally Vigilant illus
trates that debate, discussion, and even criticism of the First
Amendment are a positive thing. Certainly, the contributors to
Eternally Vigilant disagree in ways that we cannot easily reconcile.
Vincent Blasi's account of the First Amendment freedoms as
grounded in human dignity and character, for example, is inconsistent
with Richard Posner's amoral cost-benefit analysis of those same free
doms. Similarly, Stanley Fish's mantra that no neutral theory of
free expression exists is a direct attack on Robert Post's attempts to
reconcile theory and doctrine. While some might view this disagree
ment as cause for concern - evidence that First Amendment doctrine
16. Professors Fish, Fish. and Sunstein, for example, openly acknowledge previous pub
lication of pieces from which their essays are taken. Pp. 199 (Fish), 257 (Fiss), 185 (Sunstein).
Professors Greenawalt and Strauss also have written extensively on closely related issues.
See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME. AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989);
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877
(1996).
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and scholarship are incoherent or that the Court's decisions result
from politics rather than rational principles - they are mistaken. The
varying viewpoints contained within Eternally Vigilant show that First
Amendment freedoms are worth talking about. Their value comes less
from the ultimate conclusions reached by courts and scholars than
from the existence of an ongoing dialogue among courts, scholars, and
the public regarding their meaning. As John Milton argued with
respect to censorship:
There be [those] who perpetually complain of schisms and sects, and
make it such a calamity that any man dissents from their maxims. 'Tis
their own pride and ignorance which causes the disturbing, who neither
will hear with meekness nor can convince, ·yet all must be suppressed
which is not found in their [doctrines]. [They] are the troublers, ... the
dividers of unity, who neglect and permit not others to unite those dis
severed pieces which are yet wanting to the body of truth. [But] [t]o be
still searching what we know not, by what we know ...this is the golden
rule ... and makes up the best harmony ... not the forced and outward
union of cold, and neutral, and inwardly divided minds.17

Surely, we can extend this positive view of public disagreement to
discussions of what the First Amendment does or should do.
The editors of Eternally Vigilant clearly recognize the importance
of "dialogue" as a primary good of both First Amendment doctrine
and scholarship, most notably in their characterization of the history
of free speech as an "experiment" that implies "a need for ongoing re
view and adjustment" (p. ix). Their prefatory colloquy, structured as a
dialogue between Stone and Bollinger, further emphasizes that fact.
As that colloquy moves from topic to topic, it allows the editors to
discuss the many facets of free speech history and scholarship,
reflecting their complexity, richness, and varied nature. To be sure, the
editors disagree on certain issues. But they do so in the context of a
discussion, which allows give and take and aptly illustrates the value of
dialogue. With this as the foundation for later essays, it should be
obvious to the reader that the differing viewpoints are not an evil.
Rather they are both a natural aspect of our daily lives and necessary
to the evolution and understanding of free speech jurisprudence.
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of Eternally Vigilant, however, is
that so many of the essays go beyond abstract theoretical and doctrinal
discussions to explore influences on how First Amendment law is
made and how those influences affect past and current decisions.
David Strauss's essay describing the common-law overtones of free
speech jurisprudence does this best, as he meticulously describes how
the Court's doctrine evolved from early decisions to the current state
of the law. Kent Greenawalt also focuses on the evolution of the clear
and-present-danger test and its implications for criminal speech.
17. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 42-43 (George H. Sabine ed., 1951 ).
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Frederick Schauer's demonstration that nonspeech issues are as
responsible for free speech doctrine as free expression concerns also
has an empirical focus, as do Cass Sunstein's and Owen Fiss's
approaches, which view the law of free expression through the reality
of modern broadcasting. Even Vincent Blasi's primarily philosophical
essay reflects an understanding of actual human behavior often
missing in theoretical scholarship.
This differs somewhat from most scholarship associated with the
First Amendment, which often involves an examination and critique
of the appropriate theoretical underpinnings for the protection of
expression, the current doctrinal rules, or the relationship between
theory and doctrine. There are many advantages to this scholarship,
primarily that it provides valuable new insights into protection of
expression.18 But isolated discussions of theory and doctrine can take
us only so far and rarely explain the entire picture. As Jerome Frank
noted years ago, legal decisions are the result of many influences, of
which the rule applied and its underlying theory are but two.19 The
Court is a cultural institution where judges make decisions in often dif
ficult social and political contexts that change over time. There are
unspoken assumptions or events underlying these decisions that
ultimately come to be expressed in different doctrinal rules. The
collection of essays in Eternally Vigilant, by examining various
potential influences on the development of free speech law, recognizes
this fact and brings a greater maturity to our understanding of the
First Amendment.
To illustrate, one need look no further than the clear-and-present
danger test that is the focus of so many of Eternally Vigilant's essays.20
That test allowed courts to assess whether speech posed "a clear and
present danger that [it] will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent."21 First announced in Schenck v.
18. For example, philosophical accounts of.free expression often have broad rhetorical
appeal for those looking for reasons to protect speech. See, for example, Justice Brandeis's
eloquent appeal in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) ( Brandeis, J., concurring).
They also often identify "broad patterns in constitutional law" that have great explanatory
power regarding doctrinal issues. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 9, at 141. Finally, theo
retical accounts, with their reliance on principle and consistency, "may help sustain a faith
that constitutional practice involves a shared commitment to live by principle, and not by
opportunism, sophistry, and manipulation." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a
Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 566 (1999). Doctrinal scholarship can similarly
find broad patterns in law, see, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983), as well as highlight significant flaws or
advantages in the Court's approach.
19. Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 40 (1931).
20. It is always difficult when reviewing a �olle.cted set of essays to focus on only one

aspect of them as one risks missing other significant contributions. I focus on the clear-and
present-danger test primarily because it has such significance to free-speech doctrine and
because it provides a continuous example for discussion.
21. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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United States, the Court used it for decades to assess whether seditious

advocacy or other "dangerous" speech was subject to criminal
punishment, or protected expression under the First Amendment.
Conventional wisdom now holds that Schenck's clear-and-present
danger test was a disaster, allowing punishment of speech that posed
no harm to the government or public,22 and most people readily
applaud the Court's apparent repudiation of it in favor of a much
stricter standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio.23 But how do we reach this
conclusion? Neither abstract theory nor doctrine helps much in this
regard.
Of course, judges and scholars have appealed to theory in criticiz
ing the clear-and-present-danger test - most notably Justices Holmes
and Brandeis in their influential opinions condemning several deci
sions applying that test to uphold convictions of speakers who did little
more than criticize the government. Holmes, for example, claimed
that "the theory of our Constitution" is that "the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market."24 Brandeis argued that our Constitution protects "the
power of reason as applied through public discussion."25 This is power
ful rhetoric - so powerful that it still resonates with modern courts
and individuals, who frequently cite it as a normative foundation for
protecting speech. But it tells us little about the clear-and-present
danger test. While the Holmes/Brandeis philosophies may support a
more speech-protective version of the clear-and-present-danger test
than applied in the Court's early cases, they do not compel that result.
Nothing in Holmes's marketplace of ideas theory or Brandeis's auton
omy theory tells us how "clear" or how "present" the danger must be,
or what kinds of dangers justify suppression of speech. Theoretical
accounts are simply too vague to have much normative value with
respect to the clear-and-present-danger test.
Furthermore, the Holmes/Brandeis philosophies do not provide a
positive explanation of the Court's actions in moving away from the
clear-and-present-danger test. There is no evidence that the Branden
burg Court adopted these theoretical accounts as its driving force in
seditious advocacy cases. In fact, the opinion is devoid of philosophical
discussion, instead focusing on the concrete problem of where to draw

22. See, e.g., David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes, Rethinking the Clear and Present Dan
ger Test, 73 IND. L.J. 1217 (1998); Hans A. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined:
Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970).
23. 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that state can punish speech only
if it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action").
24. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
25. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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the line between punishable incitement of illegal activity and
protected speech.
Abstract, doctrinal discussions also have only weak explanatory
power regarding our dislike of, and the Court's movement away from,
the clear-and-present-danger test. There is nothing inherently wrong
with that test as a doctrinal tool. True, it is fundamentally a balancing
test susceptible to subjective judgments of harm, but that alone does
not condemn it. The world of constitutional adjudication is full of
balancing tests that seem to work reasonably well. In fact, outside of
the context of seditious advocacy, the clear-and-present-danger test
was often applied in a manner quite protective of speech,26 suggesting
that balancing as a concept was not so much the. problem as was the
application of that balancing in a particular context.
In order to understand truly our dislike of the clear-and-present
danger test, we must look beyond this abstract balancing test to the
influences on its application. As David Strauss's and Kent
Greenawalt's essays aptly demonstrate, our condemnation of the
clear-and-present-danger test, and the Court's ultimate repudiation of
it, are both largely the result of evolutionary processes. As the Court
repeatedly upheld convictions of seemingly innocuous speech, judges
and scholars began to question the wisdom of the clear-and-present
danger approach in the seditious advocacy context. Thus, the Court's
evolution to the rule in Brandenburg was not simply repudiation of
one abstract test in favor of another. It was a response to the decisions
upholding convictions that came before, which the Court began to
view as mistaken applications of a test that proved far too malleable
and subject to political pressure, especially during certain crisis
periods. In essence, our view of the clear-and-present-danger test, and
the Court's retreat from it, reflect the accumulated wisdom of fifty
years of history, which revealed the kind of abuse that such a test
might engender. By going beyond isolated theoretical or doctrinal
accounts and examining the impact that this evolution had on the law,
Strauss and Greenawalt flesh out our understanding of how First
Amendment doctrine came to be what it is and what the implications
of that evolution are for current doctrine. Whether one does this in the
context of the clear-and-present-danger test or in the many other con
texts contained in the other essays, the desire to explore outside influ
ences on the law can only enrich the already rich First Amendment
literature.

26. See, e.g. , Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Bd. of Educ.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); Bridges
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).

v.
v.
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III. FURTHER FACILITATING FIRST AMENDMENT DISCUSSIONS

For all that Eternally Vigilant contributes to a better understanding
of First Amendment doctrine, it could have done more. Although the
contributors' explanations of legal doctrine and its real-world context
are valuable, the essays still focus mainly on the evolution of legal doc
trine alone, with little discussion of the social, political, psychological,
or other influences that inform many of the decisions they discuss. To
be fair, many of the contributors explicitly acknowledge these influ
ences. David Strauss and Kent Greenawalt, for example, refer to
certain historical accounts of social and political conditions during
World War I, the Red Scare, and the Cold War periods, in which the
most significant clear-and-present-danger cases were decided. But
their references are limited with no detailed discussion of those condi
tions' impact on the Court's decisions. As such, they tend to reinforce
the notion that law can be studied in isolation, although I do not think
that the authors or the editors intend this. A greater examination of
these types of influences on the Court's decisions would complement
the evolutionary approach discussed above and advance our under
standing of the Court's doctrine even further.27 By providing a con
crete context in which to place the Court's doctrine, this examination
would give greater access to it and further facilitate discussion.
Continuing with the clear-and-present-danger test discussed above,
this Section will first examine Schenck and the social, historical, and
political forces surrounding it. It will then discuss how examination
can facilitate better understanding of and dialogue regarding the
Court's jurisprudence.
A.

Schenck and Its Historical, Social, and Political Context

Schenck, the decision in which the clear-and-present-danger test
originated, arose out of government prosecutions of members of the
Socialist Party for conspiring to obstruct the draft in violation of the
Espionage Act of 1917. During World War I, Charles Schenck and
other party members mailed pamphlets attacking the draft to potential
draftees.28 One side of the pamphlet urged that the draft was unconsti
tutional and that people join the Socialist Party in its attempt to repeal

27. There are many scholars who have done admirable historical work on free expres
sion issues. See, e.g. , MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING
PRIVILEGE" (2000); MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991); RABBAN, supra note l; Geoffrey R. Stone,
Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 335 (2003); William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anti Communism:
The Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 Sur. CT. REV. 375. Unfortunately, such
studies are usually free-standing, and other scholars rarely incorporate these or other
historical studies in an in-depth manner.
28. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49 (1919).
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the Conscription Act.29 The other side contained somewhat stronger
language, urging people to "assert [their] rights" and arguing that "[i]n
lending tacit or silent consent to the conscription law, in neglecting to
assert your rights, you are (whether unknowingly or not) helping to
condone and support a most infamous and insidious conspiracy to
abridge and destroy the sacred and cherished rights of a free people. "30
Finding that such statements tended to interfere with the war effort, a
jury easily convicted Schenck.
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected Schenck's argument that
the First Amendment protected the pamphlets' Statements. Justice
Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, acknowledged that in
peacetime, defendant's speech might have been protected by the First
Amendment.31 Noting, however, the wartime context and that the
"character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
done," Holmes framed the First Amendment test as "whether the
words used [were] in such circumstances and [were] of such a nature
as to create a clear and ·present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."32 Although
Holmes acknowledged that many of the statements urged lawful resis
tance, he nevertheless found that they presented a clear and present
danger of draft obstruction. According to Holmes, the defendant's
intent to obstruct the draft could be presumed (despite the lack of evi
dence) because the pamphlet "would not have been sent unless it had
been intended to have some effect."33 This presumed intent combined with wartime circumstances - justified extreme caution
and the rejection of Schenck's free speech claim.
Holmes's opinion is notable for its recognition that the clear-and
present-danger test depends largely upon the concrete circumstances
in which it is applied, although, ironically, he ignored such circum
stances, other than the general wartime reference, in reaching his deci
sion. To the extent Holmes found the wartime circumstances impor
tant, it is useful to examine them. How did the Espionage Act and
related legislation come about? How was it used? What was the public
sentiment regarding World War I and those who protested it? What
were the government's actions with respect to the war and those who
spoke out against it? All of these questions are part of the Schenck
equation and the answers to them shed considerable light on our
response to the clear-and-present-danger test and related issues.

29. RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS 213-14 (1987).
30. Id. at 214.
31. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 51.
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From its inception, World War I was largely unpopular among
influential groups who were " 'apathetic if not actually hostile to
fighting.' "34 Like Charles Schenck, many of those opposing the war
were foreign-born Americans or immigrants (especially Irish and
German), socialists, pacifists, and progressives who belonged to radi
cal groups, such as the Industrial Workers of the World ("IWW"),
Non-Partisan League ("NPL"), and the Socialist Party of America
("SPA").35 Such groups were especially vocal, calling for
"[c]ontinuous, active, and public opposition to the war, through dem
onstrations, mass petitions, and all other means within [their]
power."36 Although radical groups were not popular with Americans
generally, during this early period there were substantial increases in
IWW, NPL, and SPA membership, giving them an even more power
ful voice against the war.37
Concerned about vocal antipathy toward the war and convinced of
the need to present a united patriotic front, the Wilson administration
found ways to repress antiwar sentiment. President Wilson himself
tried to whip up national hysteria regarding opponents to the war,
relying heavily on negative portrayals of immigrants and other foreign
influences. As early as his 1915 State of the Union address to
Congress, Wilson claimed that
the gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been ut
tered within our own borders.There are citizens of the United States ...
born under other flags but welcomed by our generous naturalization
laws ... who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries
of our national life .

. ..38

In his 1917 address asking Congress to recognize a state of war, Wilson
claimed that German spies hidden within the United States
government and its communities threatened security.39 A few months
later, in an address that was widely distributed throughout the
country, Wilson accused "the military masters of Germany" of filling

34. ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA 105
(1978) (quoting THOMAS A. BAILEY, WOODROW WILSON AND THE LOST PEACE 15
(1944)).
35. HARRY N. SCHEIBER, THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 7
(1960).
36. NATHAN FINE, LABOR AND FARMER PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1828-1928,
at 13-14 (1928) (reprinting Majority Report of the SPA as adopted at its April 1917 national
convention); see also JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE DECLINE OF SOCIALISM IN AMERICA, 19121925, al 125-27 (1967).
37. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 105-06; ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY
IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA 28-29 (1955).
38. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress (Dec. 7, 1915), in 53 CONG. REC.
99 (1915).
39. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress (Apr. 2, 1917), in 55 CONG REC.
104 (1917).
.
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"our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators
and [seeking] to corrupt the opinion of our people."40 Wilson further
explicitly linked foreign enemies to radical groups, noting that
German officials employed "liberals in their enterprise. They are using
men . . . socialists, the leaders of labor" to sow disloyalty.41 Thus,
people like Schenck, who were little more than social activists, came to
be equated with spies and other traitors.
Wilson's efforts, aided by a mainstream press generally willing to
engage in propaganda and groups of private vigilantes willing to spy
upon their neighbors, sowed the seeds of intolerance and suspicion of
radical or heavily immigrant groups.42 In the years leading up to and
during the war, there were numerous acts of violence expressing
"nativist loathing of the foreign-born and irrational fear of radical
groups."43 Despite these actions, antiwar groups remained vocal. As
the Wilson administration became concerned that existing laws and
actions were insufficient to handle antiwar sentiment,44 it looked to
more formal means to repress dissent.
The Wilson administration used a variety of legal tools to deal with
the "problem" of disloyalty. In 1917 the President issued a series of
proclamations that allowed the government to register, arrest, and
intern "enemy aliens," and that established, among other things, a
loyalty program for federal employees, a "Committee on Public
Information" (a propaganda committee designed to corral the press
into voluntary self-censorship), a "Board of Censorship" responsible
for scrutinizing communications leaving the country, and a program
expanding the censorship power of the Navy over cable lines.45 In
addition, arguing that censorship was "absolutely necessary to the
public safety,"46Wilson also proposed legislation designed to "repress
'political agitation,' particularly 'disloyal propaganda' threatening the
formation and maintenance of the armed forces."47

40. President Woodrow Wilson, Flag Day Address (June 14, 1917), in 55 CONG. REC.
app. at 332 (1917).
41. Id. at 334; see a/so JEFFERY A. SMITH, WAR AND PRESS FREEDOM 135 (1999) (dis
cussing distribution of flag day address).
42. MURRAY, supra note 37, at 20; SMITH, supra note 41, at 135-37.
43. MURRAY, supra note 37, at 32; SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 50-51; SMITH, supra
note 41, at 135.
44. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 249-50; SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 23.
45. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 108-09; SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 14-17, 21.
46. SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 18 (quoting Letter from President Woodrow Wilson to
Rep. Webb (May 22, 1917), reprinted in 3 PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 46
(1927)).
47. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 249 (quoting John Lord O'Brian, Special Asst. Atty
Gen.).
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In proposing the original version of the Espionage Act, Wilson
sought substantial authority to forbid the publication of hostile utter
ances that might interfere with the war effort.48 Congressional and
public response to such censorship power was ambivalent at best and
eventually that aspect of the legislation died.49 As adopted, the
Espionage Act instead provided criminal penalties for intentionally
making false reports that interfere with the war effort, causing insub
ordination or disloyalty in the military forces, or obstructing the draft.
It further authorized the Postmaster to refuse to mail materials
violating the Act.so Although these provisions did not amount to the
prior restraint Wilson sought, there is evidence that much of Congress
desired the Act to be used to restrict speech.s1
In 1918 Congress took yet another step toward repression. Despite
the fact that over 250 people had been convicted under the Espionage
Act in less than a year, members of Congress and the Wilson admini
stration were unhappy with the Act's inability to reach some disloyal
utterances.s2 Claiming that "some of the most dangerous types of
propaganda were either made from good motives or else that the trai
torous motive was not provable,'' the Attorney General argued that
the intent requirement of the Espionage Act posed too high a barrier
for conviction and urged Congress to adopt a law specifically aimed at
disloyal utterances.s3 The Sedition Act,s4 adopted in May of 1918,
solved this problem by punishing publication of information intended
to cause contempt for the United States government, the Constitution,
or the flag of the United States, or to support a country at war with the
United States.
The Wilson administration viewed the Espionage and Sedition
Acts as its "most effective method of suppressing unwanted 'propa
ganda' and of dealing with 'disturbing malcontents.' "ss During the
war, federal attorneys brought over 2,100 indictments under the
48. SMITH, supra note 41, at 131.
49. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 250-55; SMITH, supra note 41, at 131; Stone, supra note 27,
at 346-49.
50. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I,§ 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219.
51. The extent of congressional desire to suppress speech is open to debate. David Rab
ban argues that contemporaneous legislative debates "reveal that the majority of
Congress intended the Espionage Act to encourage the restrictive uudicial) decisions that
resulted." RABBAN, supra note 1, at 250. On the other hand, Geoffrey Stone argues that
"[a)lthough Congress' stance in enacting the Espionage Act could hardly be characterized as
civil libertarian; [most congressmen had) a genuine concern for the potential impact of the
legislation on the freedom of speech and of the press." Stone, supra note 27, at 352.
52. SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 23.
53. Id. at 23-24. For a more in-depth account of the causes leading up to the Sedition
Act, see POLENBERG, supra note 29, at 30-34.
54. Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, §§ 1, 3, 40 Stat. 553, 553 (repealed 1921).
55. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 256.
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Acts.56 Most of these indictments involved speech critical of the war or
the government rather than overt acts of disloyalty.57 Thus, individuals
were indicted for such things as
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

advising conscripted men · that they should have "a pick and
shovel laboring for the working men instead of carrying a gun
for the capitalists";
distributing a pamphlet preaching that "Christians should not
kill in wars";
petitioning the governor of South Dakota to change a political
decision exempting certain counties from the draft;
stating that the capitalists' war would make liberty bonds
worthless;58
stating that "[w]e must make the world safe for democracy,
even if we have to bean the goddess ofliberty to do it";
stating that "[m)en conscripted· to Europe are virtually con
demned to death and everyone knows it";
stating that "I am for the people and· the government is for the
profiteers';;
·

•

" circulating a pamphlet urging the re-election
Congressman who had voted against conscription";59

•

claiming "to hell with Wilson; I am a Republican";

•

writing a letter denouncing Liberty Loans; and

•

·

of

a

giving a speech denouncing the conscription of Puerto Rican
citizens who refused to accept American citizenship.60

Such indictments reached far into the realm of seemingly innocent
speech, especially given that many .statements were made in private
conversations rather than public addresses.61 Many prosecutions,
however, went beyond overly zealous and were specifically designed
to destroy the radical, socialist groups ·feared by the Wilson admini
stration, such as the IWW and SPA of which Charles Schenck was a
member. Thus, as one scholar notes,

56. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 113.
57. ZECHARIAH CHAFFE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, 60-69 (1941);
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 113. As one Wilson . administration official later acknowl
edged, no person was convicted of actual espionage activity under the 1917 Act. JOHN LORD
O'BRIAN, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 49-50 (1955).
58. These examples come from RABBAN, supra note 1, at 259-60.
59. These examples are found in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 113-14.
60. These last three examples are from SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 23 nn.47, 53. For
further examples, see CHAFFE, supra note 57, at 51-57; Stone, supra note 27, at 338-41.
61. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 115.
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seemingly random prosecutions had a pattern behind them; persons or
publications "who had assured economic and social status, did not ques
tion the basis of our economic system, accepted the war as a holy crusade
and expressed their views in somewhat temperate language" were al
lowed to criticize the government; those who suffered were "those whose
views on the war were derived from some objectionable economic or
social doctrines ... regardless of their attitude towards Germany" along
with obscure individuals who used "indiscreet or impolite, sometimes
vulgar language to express their views."62
In this way, such prosecutions were used less to punish disloyalty than
to enforce national conformity - either by frightening into silence
those without sufficient social position to fight back or by systemati
cally harassing disfavored groups.
The courtroom provided protestors little protection from such
harassment. Given the nativist sentiment and hysteria stirred up by the
Wilson administration, most judges and juries easily convicted those
accused under the Acts, apparently with the attitude that "an oppo
nent of war was guilty unless proved innocent."63 At least 1,055 of the
2,100 defendants indicted were convicted, including over 150 IWW
leaders.64 Courts reached these conclusions by construing the require
ments of the Espionage and Sedition Acts loosely. One judge, for
example, instructed a jury that the defendant's attempts to obstruct
Red Cross fundraising efforts violated the Espionage Act because it
interfered with the "military and naval forces of the United States."65
To the extent that defendants raised First Amendment defenses to
their prosecutions, courts either ignored them or resolved them under
the prevailing "bad tendency" test, an extremely deferential test
allowing punishment of speech if it might tend to cause harm.66 In
many courtrooms, judges and jurors viewed their verdicts as patriotic
statements and imposed severe sentences "as a means of fostering
unity and bolstering morale. "67 Thus, federal courtrooms, the last
bastion of defense against unfair convictions for simple criticism of the
government or war effort, were dominated by actors whose response
to the war was so extreme that even Justice Holmes, the author of
Schenck, later described it as "hysterical."68

62. Id. (quoting SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 32).
63. H.C. PETERSON & GILBERT C. FITE, OPPONENTS OF WAR 1917-1918, at 153 (1957);
see also RABBAN, .mpra note 1, at 256-61.
64. SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 19.
65. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 260.
66. Id. at 256.
67. SCHEIBER, supra note 35, at 43 n.7.
68. Letter from Justice Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 16, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS 189, 190 (Mark DeWolf Howe ed., 1953).
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Some Lessons from History

This is the context in which Schenck arose; it is not pretty. It
certainly was not conducive to free expression given a president who,
determined to suppress any possible barriers to his goals, enlisted
Congress and the public to create an atmosphere of national hysteria
and nativist sentiment that silenced critics. The hysteria engendered
by the administration permeated the courtroom as well, with zealous
prosecutions and jurors imbued with patriotic fervor making it nearly
impossible for accused protestors to avoid convictions. Awareness of
these circumstances gives context to our discussion of Schenck's clear
and-present-danger test in a way that even Strauss's and Greenawalt's
evolutionary accounts cannot.
This history reveals, for example, that Justice Holmes's characteri
zation of the clear-and-present-danger test was merely an extension of
lower courts' use of the bad-tendency test to silence dissent in war
time.69 Holmes never meant for the clear-and-present-danger test to
be applied in a protective manner - at least not in Schenck. True, one
can probably glean this from reading the case, but the historical
discussion gives an added flavor emphasizing the strength and depth
of judicial hostility toward war protestors that informs our assessment
of the clear-and-present-danger test's application and our desire to
move away from such a test over time.
This study also reveals much about the nature of human actors,
which may facilitate further understanding of our dislike of the clear
and-present-danger test. When one is aware of intense public hysteria
surrounding radical groups and protestors, it is relatively easy to pre
dict that the clear-and-present-danger test will be an ineffective tool
for protecting speech. As cognitive psychologists have tested empiri
cally, in times of great fear, people tend to overestimate greatly the
likelihood that certain particularly dreaded or catastrophic events will
occur.70 As a result, they favor regulation of such risks, even if the
actual likelihood of occurrence is minute.71 There is little reason to
think that judges are immune to such cognitive biases.72 Thus, the
clear-and-present-danger test, when used by judges in times of crisis,
may provide little if any protection for speech.73 Schenck is arguably
69. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 279-98.
70. PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEfYfION OF RISK 220-31 (2000).
71. HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK 1 71, 174-75 (1996); SLOVIC, supra note
70, at 152.
72. Chris Guthrie & Jeff Rachlinksi et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
777, 816-18 (2001) (noting that judges are often subject to the same cognitive biases as aver
age individuals).
73. See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-making:
A Case Study of Dennis v. United States (June 1 6, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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an example of that fact, as are many other cases decided in crisis
times.74 It is only by examining the history surrounding these cases,
however, that we truly come to understand the clear-and-present
danger test as grounded in human nature and not simply as an
abstract, but flawed, doctrinal tool.
The Wilson administration's apparent dual motives in suppressing
speech further inform our response to the clear-and-present-danger
test. The Wilson administration used the Espionage and Sedition Act
prosecutions not just to silence dissent but also to destroy certain
disfavored groups. These mixed motives suggest a willingness on the
executive's part to use crises as excuses to further other agendas. The
lenient application of the clear-and-present-danger test in Schenck and
other crisis-period cases facilitated the administration's pretextual use
of such crises. This government opportunism, while perhaps inevita
ble,75 is hardly desirable, as the Court has come to acknowledge that
certain governmental motives for regulating speech are illegitimate.76
Thus, our distaste for the clear-and-present-danger test may stem in
part from its inability in times of crisis to protect against illegitimate
government actions.
This historical account complements Strauss's and Greenawalt's
evolutionary accounts of the test. As Strauss noted, judges deciding
constitutional cases respond to previous decisions and determine
whether adjustments or retrenchments are needed when ruling on the
case before them. They do not, however, view law in a vacuum,
determining simply that X application of Y rule was bad. Rather, they
examine the broader context in which rules are constituted and
applied and their consequences. Thus, the Brandenburg Court
eschewed the clear-and-present-danger test not simply because the
defendant Ku Klux Klansman involved in that case was harmless but
because, with fifty years of hindsight, most of the defendants involved
in clear-and-present-danger cases were harmless. That political
machinations and hysteria were often the primary motivators for

74. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 12; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1945). For a discussion of judicial capitulation to hysteria in Korematsu and related cases,
see Christina E. Wells & Joseph Kuhl, The Japanese-American Detention Cases and Their
Relationship to Events in the United States After September 11th, 5 INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
91, 94-101 (2002).
75. See generally CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP (1948).
76. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) ("The First

Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in
the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.") (opinion of Stevens, J.,
writing for plurality); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock prin
ciple underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the ex
pression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
For a discussion of illegitimate government motives, see Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating
A utonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurispru
dence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 174-75 (1997).
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earlier decisions was a fact of which the Supreme Court was aware and
against which it was trying to guard in Brandenburg.
Finally, this study of history can inform modern debate regarding
First Amendment freedoms both for scholars and for the public. For
example, the modern Court's doctrine treats laws regulating speech
based upon content with far greater antipathy than those laws that do
not. The Court's hostility toward content-based regulations is closely
associated with the clear-and-present-danger cases, although the
Court rarely links the two explicitly.77 Knowledge and understanding
of this history may inform scholarly debates sparked by commentators
who increasingly criticize the Court's hostility toward content-based
regulations.78
The importance of Schenck's history with respect to the public may
be more straightforward. In the current climate of heightened fear that
exists post-September 11th, citizens have expressed the notion that
civil rights may need to be sacrificed in the name of security. In fact,
the phrase "clear and present danger" has reared its ugly head again
as a justification for limiting civil liberties.79 In such times, it is useful
to be reminded of the depth and magnitude of past mistakes made
with that same sentiment in mind.
IV. CONCLUSION
None of this is to say that the editors of Eternally Vigilant should
have put together a different book. As it currently stands, the editors'
and authors' contributions to the discussion regarding the First
Amendment are substantial and thoughtful. Eternally Vigilant is, how
ever, representative of much First Amendment scholarship, which
focuses too often on theory and doctrine without also discussing the
variety of real-world influences on constitutional decisions. In a book
that celebrates the "experimental" nature of free speech law, recogni77. Many of the cases involving the clear-and-present-danger test reflect the presence
of an illegitimate government motive that is at the heart of the Court's antipathy to
content-based regulations. For example, many of the seditious advocacy cases involved gov
ernment fear that antiwar speech would persuade citizens to oppose the war. See, e.g. ,
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617
(1919). Concern with attempts to regulate persuasive effect clearly underlies the Court's ap
proach to content-based regulations. See Wells, supra note 76, at 173-75 (and cases cited
therein); cf Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2447 ( 1996) (noting the relationship between the
Court's use of strict scrutiny and earlier clear-and-present-danger precedents).
78. David Rabban, for example, uses much of the history surrounding Schenck to re
spond to Professors Sunstein and Fiss, who argue that we should welcome governmental
regulation of content in some instances. RABBAN, supra note 1, at 381 -93.
79. Testifying before Congress in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks,
Attorney General John Ashcroft claimed that "terrorism is a clear and present danger to
Americans today." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft Outlines
Mobilization Against Terrorism Act (Sept. 24, 2001).
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tion of the importance of the circumstances under which that experi
ment takes place would be welcome - a fact made even more true
given the authors' expressed desire to reach "non-experts." The belief
in free expression is a widely held ideal. It is, however, an abstract one
that the public and, occasionally, legal scholars are willing to sacrifice
in certain concrete circumstances. The more one is educated regarding
the concrete influences on the development of First Amendment law,
the better our discussion of the merits of those sacrifices can be.

